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This paper examines the contemporary politics of intellectual property (IP) and 
investment in the World Trade Organization (WTO). I examine the underlying and 
perennial conflicts that pit developing and developed countries against each other in these 
two areas and the nature of the two agreements reached during the Uruguay Round, the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). I then analyze developed 
countries’ efforts to push beyond the TRIPS and TRIMS agreements, and, critically, 
developing countries’ success in forestalling these efforts. Developing countries have 
“prevailed” in the current international conflicts over IP and investment not by securing 
rules that they desire, but rather by preventing the imposition of arrangements that they 
regard as worse than the WTO status quo. 
 
To understand how weak countries have managed to overcome developed 
countries’ IP- and investment-related campaigns and thus prevail (even in the qualified 
sense) in an important international setting like the WTO, I draw on the insights from two 
approaches to the study of international political economy (IPE), structuralism and 
institutionalism. The structuralist approach focuses on the distribution of resources as the 
key determinant for explaining international outcomes, while the institutionalist approach 
focuses on the effects of rules. What we see is that, within a broad set of constraints that 
is determined by the distribution of resources, the rules of the WTO drive the outcomes. 
In particular, the WTO’s rules of unweighted voting and consensus decision-making have 
inflated developing countries’ influence in the post-Uruguay Round setting and allowed 
them to block the efforts of wealthier countries to impose new constraints on national 
policy in the areas of IP and investment. In the concluding section I address a subsequent 
question that logically follows from the analysis: why, if developing countries can block 
developed countries’ initiatives now were they unable to do so during the Uruguay 
Round? 
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Resources, Rules and International Political Economy:  








The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which began in 1986 and 
concluded with the signing of the “Final Act” in 1994, marked a watershed in the making 
of the international political economy. In addition to giving birth to a new international 
organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Uruguay Round introduced 
binding agreements in new areas that had previously been left out of the international 
trading regime. That is, while the WTO’s predecessor organization, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), addressed national policies in tariffs and non-
tariff trade measures, the Uruguay Round addresses policies in a variety of “trade-
related” activities, such as intellectual property (IP) and investment.  
 
The broadening of the international trade regime to include binding constraints in 
these new issue areas was fiercely resisted by many developing countries. Yet, despite 
their resistance to negotiating IP and investment, and the unfavourable nature of the 
subsequent agreements, developing countries accepted the final outcome. Developed 
countries’ insistence that the Uruguay Round be an all or nothing affair—a “single 
undertaking”—meant that developing countries could not approve the Final Act, with its 
promises of increased access to North American and European markets, the final 
elimination of the onerous Multi-Fiber Arrangement, and the establishment of a more 
useful system for dispute resolution, without also accepting agreements that imposed new 
multilateral disciplines on IP and investment (along with other areas, such as services and 
subsidies and so on).  
 
In the period after the Uruguay Round, the “North-South” conflicts over IP and 
investment remain politically charged. Developed countries have sought to secure 
commitments beyond that stipulated by the WTO. In both policy areas, developed 
countries were unsatisfied with the settlements reached in the Uruguay Round and sought 
to impose additional limitations on developing countries’ policy options. And in both 
policy areas developing countries adamantly resisted and successfully turned back these 
efforts.  
 
How have weak countries managed to prevail in an important international setting 
like WTO? To address this question I draw on the insights from two approaches to the 
 
* I wish to thank the participants at the June 2007 conference at Monash University’s Prato Centre for their 
helpful comments on my presentation, and to Jeff Waincymer for insightful and constructive feedback on 
an earlier draft of this chapter.  
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study of international political economy (IPE), structuralism and institutionalism. The 
structuralist approach focuses on the distribution of resources as the key determinant for 
explaining international outcomes, while the institutionalist approach focuses on the 
effects of rules. What we see is that, within a broad set of constraints that is determined 
by the distribution of resources, the rules of the WTO drive the outcomes. In particular, 
the WTO’s rules of unweighted voting and consensus decision-making have inflated 
developing countries’ influence in the post-Uruguay Round setting and allowed them to 
block the efforts of wealthier countries to impose new constraints on national policy in 
the areas of IP and investment.  
 
In the second section of the chapter I present these two analytic approaches to the 
study of IPE, deriving a set of expectations about North-South relations. In sections three 
and four I consider the North-South politics of IP and investment, respectively, both in 
the Uruguay Round and the post-Uruguay Round period. These issue areas are marked by 
endemic and underlying sources of conflict, which I highlight in each instance. In both 
cases we see developing countries blocking developed countries’ efforts to impose new 
international regulations, and in both instances the power that allows developing 
countries’ to “prevail”
1 is derived from rules and not resources. In the fifth and 
concluding section, I summarize the findings and I address a subsequent question that 
logically follows from the analysis: why, if developing countries can block developed 
countries’ initiatives now were they unable to do so during the Uruguay Round? 
 
Before proceeding, a caveat is in order. Throughout the chapter I refer to 
“developed” and “developing” countries, and I treat them as homogenous blocks. Doing 
so is problematic, to say the least, and invites criticisms from all corners. To be sure, not 
all wealthy countries share the same interests on all issues and nor do all poorer 
countries; plenty of issues in the international political economy – and even the WTO – 
are marked by cross-cutting alliances where some coalitions of developed and developing 
countries are pitted against other coalitions of developed and developing countries. 
Notwithstanding these observations, it is also true that there exist certain underlying 
cleavages in the international political economy that are based on income – that countries 
of different levels of economic development are likely to have different interests in the 
regulation of the international political economy and, these differences are the source of 
persistent and endemic conflict. Indeed, an examination of the politics of the post-World 
War II international trading system leaves the undeniable sense that the “North-South” 




Resources, Rules, and North-South Conflict 
 
Traditionally the field of IPE has been organized around the topic of international 
cooperation and coordination.
3 Scholars have concerned themselves with how countries 
with overlapping but non-identical interests and preferences can act collectively. With the 
basic metaphor being the prisoners’ dilemma, where the result of each country striving 
for its most-preferred choice is an outcome that is worse for all actors than had they 
cooperated and settled mutually on second-best choices, much of the field of IPE has 
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been constructed around the problem of collective action and the challenges to achieving 
international cooperation. Thus, a major strand of IPE scholarship was over the dynamics 
of “international regimes,” the formal and informal arrangements established by countries 
to establish order and achieve international cooperation.
4 
 
Scholars of IPE working from varying analytic perspectives offer different 
solutions to the problem of cooperation. Structuralists (also called “realists”) emphasize 
the role of dominant countries to either supply public goods and essentially permit others 
to free-ride on their efforts or to impose order by punishing free-riders.
5 Institutionalists 
(also called “liberals”) emphasize the cooperation-enhancing effect of information 
provided by procedures and rules and context.
6 Constructivists focus on the importance 
of ideas, the emergence of norms, and the role of experts in generating common causal 
visions of the world.
7 In this chapter I extend the first of these two perspectives, 
structuralism and institutionalism, to the topic of international cooperation in “North-
South” economic relations.  
 
In applying regime analysis to North-South relations, the first thing to emphasize 
is that the metaphor of the prisoners’ dilemma – and the underlying assumption of 
common interests – may not be appropriate for the task at hand. With many of the issues 
of salience in a North-South context, actors’ interests and the larger context of strategic 
interaction are different from in the traditional IPE approaches noted above. Different 
types of economic issues have different political characteristics, and the “deep 
integration” issues introduced in the UR have different implications for economic 
development and thus inter-state politics than standard issues of trade.
8 The sorts of rules 
on IP and investment, for example, that developed countries promote on behalf of their 
firms are unlikely to be embraced by developing countries, and the sorts of policy 
approaches that many developing countries would prefer are likely to be resisted by their 
counterparts in the “north.” In the subsequent sections I shall explain the underlying 
cleavages on IP and investment; for now the key point is simply that the distributional 
conflicts in these issue-areas are more accentuated and intense than in standard IPE. 
Indeed, the political challenges are not so much how to achieve collective action but how 
to reconcile conflicting and often incompatible  interests. As many scholars have noted, 
placing too much attention on how countries achieve international cooperation risks 
masking the distributive implications of cooperative outcomes.
9 The substantive issue-
areas analyzed in this chapter call for a focus on the more starkly distributive dimensions 
of international cooperation. 
 
Structuralists and institutionalists bring different tools and emphases to bear in 
analyzing conflict resolution. The former focus on the distribution of resources as the 
determinant of countries’ strategies and the underlying power differentials among 
countries, while the latter focus on the constraining effects that rules and context have on 
countries’ strategies and forms of behaviour. Actors have conflicting interests, and those 
with the most “power” prevail, of course – but what determines which actors have more 
or less “power?” To answer that question, structuralists look at the material resources that 
actors have at their disposal, and institutionalists emphasize rules and procedures.  
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When applied to conflict between developed and developing countries, the 
expectations derived from a structuralist approach are rather simple and straightforward. 
If rich and poor countries have conflicting interests, to the extent that rich countries have 
more resources (which by definition they do) and thus power, we should expect rich 
countries’ interests to prevail. Thus structuralists expect the international political 
economy to reflect the interests of the more developed countries 
10   
 
While the distribution of resources may be a useful predictor of how conflicts will 
be resolved, it is not without its shortcomings. Actors with more resources obviously do 
not always impose their will; actors often consent to institutional arrangements (i.e. rules) 
that mitigate resource differentials and produce outcomes that would be reflective of 
alternative distributions of power. The question, then, is why actors with more resources 
would accept institutions that constrain the exercise of their own resources? After all, 
from a structuralist perspective, such rules distort the “natural” order of things.  
 
Institutionalists provide an answer to this question by concerning themselves with 
the reasons why actors want rules in the first place. Actors demand institutions because of 
the invaluable functions that they perform: institutions reduce transaction costs involved 
in securing information, monitoring activities, and enforcing compliance. Furthermore, 
by providing standards of behavior that demarcate likely patterns of conduct, institutions 
increase predictability and reduce uncertainty.
11 Actors cannot know what the precise 
outcome of any given interaction will be, but the array and probability of different 
scenarios can be anticipated, and this certainty and predictability are cherished. 
 
Integrating these simple observations derived from the structuralist and 
institutionalist approaches leads to the following implications regarding North-South 
politics in the international economy. First, and most fundamentally, developed countries 
write the rules. To paraphrase Krasner, there are “makers, breakers, and takers”
12 of 
international institutions: developed countries are makers, developing countries are takers 
(and, at times, breakers). 
 
Yet notwithstanding their prevailing rule-making capacities, developed countries 
may create and abide by rules that fail to reflect underlying distributions of power in 
order to secure compliance on the part of developing countries and thereby reduce the 
costs of monitoring and enforcement. Indeed, the prevalence of information asymmetries, 
which raise the costs of monitoring and enforcement, gives developed countries 
incentives to establish rules that encourage self-enforcement. That is, more powerful 
actors’ demand for international rules may lead them to accept, as a side effect, the 
distorting effects that rules can have on the “natural” order of things.  
 
Developing countries are likely to accept, and perhaps appear to embrace, even 
unfavourable agreements because of the stability and predictability that institutions 
promise to deliver. For developing countries, the principal advantages of – and thus 
source of demand for – institutions are the provision of predictability and reduction of 
uncertainty. The stability that comes from knowing what is and what is not acceptable 
behaviour can help ameliorate some of the vulnerability that marks developing countries’ 
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position in the international system. Subjecting interaction to institutions gives actors 
greater confidence that conflicts will be resolved, if not entirely to their liking at least 
according to known and recognized procedures. 
 
Stability and predictability come at a high price, however. To secure developed 
countries’ formal commitment to mutually-recognized rules, and thus the bounding of the 
uncertainty that is endemic to weakness, developing countries must accept and adapt to 
rules and regulations that are generally not of their making. The upshot, then, is that 
developing countries may demand and seek to strengthen institutions, even institutions 
with unfavourable distributional effects, to secure stability and predictability. The key 
point here is that for weak actors, bad rules that are universally acknowledged are better 
than no rules, for under conditions marked by power asymmetries no rules are bad 
rules—they are simply less predictable, changing with the whims of the more powerful 
actors, and they do not promise reciprocal constraints. This is not to imply that weak 
actors do not or should not push for “better” rules, only to make sense of why they may 
work to strengthen international arrangements informed by “bad” rules.  
 
The fact that developed and developing countries all share a demand for 
institutions, and that the former will tolerate rules that fail to reflect the regnant 
distribution of resources as the price of securing compliance, provides developing 
countries with possibilities for being exerting unexpected degrees of influence on regime 
outcomes, even in issue-areas marked by conflict. That is, developing countries may 
exploit the opportunities created by institutions and achieve more favourable outcomes 
than they might otherwise be able to secure. However, such a strategy may have 
decreasing returns if it destabilizes the institutions by diminishing developed countries’ 
respect of and support for such institutions.
13  
 
In the remainder of this chapter I use these insights to shed light on North-South 
conflicts in the WTO over IP and investment.  
 
 
Politics of Intellectual Property 
 
The management of IP is a critical component of development policy.  National 
strategies for IP influence trajectories of industrial development and capacities to address 
humanitarian concerns. As pillars of national systems of innovation, IP regimes drive 
technological change; they affect trajectories of knowledge-creation and knowledge-
diffusion. And by affecting access to technologically-intensive goods, such as 
pharmaceuticals, IP regimes contribute to national public health programs.  
 
To understand the fundamental differences in approach toward managing IP, and 
hence the underlying conflict in the WTO, a quick review of the issue-area is in order. 
When governments create intellectual property rights (IPRs), they are granting actors 
rights of exclusion over knowledge and information. National policy responds to two 
objectives: encouraging the creation and commercialization of knowledge, and 
encouraging the dissemination and use of knowledge. Granting and protecting IPRs can 
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accomplish the first objective by providing actors with the means – legally enforceable 
rights of exclusion – to appropriate the returns to their investments in innovation and 
knowledge production. The catch, however, is that the instrument to achieve the first 
objective can undermine fulfillment of the second objective, because IPRs – by their very 
nature – restrict use by converting knowledge into privately owned property where 
owners set the conditions over use.
14 In sum, IP regimes have two desirable – but 
unavoidably conflicting – objectives, that knowledge be generated and that knowledge be 
used.  
 
Structural characteristics that distinguish developed and developing countries 
generate different perspectives on how to prioritize the quests for generating and using 
knowledge, thus leading to conflict over international IP rules. Wealthier countries, with 
higher levels of innovative capacity and where more research and development tends to 
produce new knowledge, have tended to opt for setting incentives to encourage and 
reward knowledge generation. Poorer countries, in contrast, with lower innovative 
capacities and where most new knowledge is that which is imported from abroad, have 
tended to opt for setting incentives to encourage dissemination and use of new 
knowledge. Thus, wealthier countries have historically offered stronger IPRs than poorer 
countries.  
 
Prior to the 1980s, the international rules on IP permitted the sort of diversity 
described in the previous paragraph. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the developed 
countries, pushed for a less flexible set of international regulations regarding national IP 
policies. Importantly, these more stringent regulations would be embedded in the 
international trade system, thus making developing countries’ ability to export goods to 
developed countries’ markets conditional on their treatment of IP.
15  
 
The hallmark of the effort to link higher standards of IP to trade was the inclusion 
of the TRIPS agreement in the Uruguay Round. Many middle-income developing 
countries were opposed to the integration of IPRs into the GATT and attempted to block 
negotiations on IP. Yet IP was a high priority for the developed countries (especially the 
US and European Community) in the Uruguay Round, and developing countries were 
unable to keep IP off the negotiating agenda.  
 
In the course of negotiating the TRIPS Agreement, developing countries were 
able to exploit differences between the US, Europe, and Japan, and thereby prevent 
inclusion of some of the strictest and most egregious restrictions on national policy, but 
few could disagree with the conclusion that the developed countries prevailed in getting 
most of what they wanted out of the negotiations.
16 TRIPS dramatically alters the 
international environment for IP policy, precluding – or at least complicating – the use of 
many instruments that have historically been used to manage knowledge and technology. 
With regard to patents, for example, the agreement requires countries to grant patents in 
areas that many countries previously treated as ineligible for patent protection (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals) and places new restrictions on states’ ability to issue 
compulsory licenses.  
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In the period since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of 
the WTO, the North-South conflict over IP has been most intense as regards access to 
essential medicines.
17 The reason for this is that there remained substantial uncertainty 
regarding just what measures countries were and were not allowed to take with regard to 
compulsory licenses and parallel imports, legal uncertainty that was exacerbated and 
compounded by developing countries facing considerable political pressure to exceed 
their new obligations in the area of IP. The principal source of pressure came from the 
US, which demanded accelerated implementation of TRIPS obligations (i.e. forego 
transition periods allowed by TRIPS) and discouraged countries from utilizing policy 
prerogatives (i.e. forego policy measures allowed by TRIPS). The “TRIPS Plus” 
campaign is illustrated by considering the treatment of developing countries in the 
USTR’s annual Special 301 Reports on IPRs. Throughout the 1990s, developing 
countries were routinely placed on the Watch List and Priority Watch List for what the 
U.S. regarded as “insufficient” protection of intellectual property. In the seven years after 
the WTO entered into effect, more than half of the countries subject to this pressure were 
developing countries. Developing countries also accounted for nearly two-thirds of the 
countries identified on the Priority Watch List. Developing countries often found 
themselves under threat even when they were behaving in compliance with the Uruguay 
Round’s IPR obligations. In pursuit of higher standards of intellectual property 
protection, the USTR singled out countries that were in compliance with TRIPS but that, 
in taking advantage of the agreement’s flexibilities, had introduced IPR regimes that the 
U.S. deemed objectionable. Thus, developing countries often found themselves subject to 
penalties not for violating TRIPS or even for being too slow in making their IPR regimes 
TRIPS-compliant, but rather for using the flexibility that TRIPS formally permits —for 
not adapting “TRIPS Plus” regimes.  
 
The focal point of the North-South conflict over IP was over compulsory licenses 
for essential drugs. A compulsory license allows a public or private actor to use patented 
knowledge without the authorization of the owner.
18 Although TRIPS places conditions 
on countries’ ability to issue compulsory licenses, conditions that, as indicated above, are 
more restrictive than pre-Uruguay Round rules, the agreement does not prohibit the use 
of CLs. But external pressures certainly discouraged developing countries from taking 
TRIPS-acceptable measures. Many of the countries included on the USTR’s Special 301 
lists, for example, were there because of the provisions in their IPR legislation regarding 
compulsory licenses. And because the US and the major pharmaceutical companies 
expressed disapproval of the use of flexibilities, countries that took advantage of their 
rights under TRIPS feared retaliation.
19 Ultimately, this strong opposition to the use of 
CLs, and prominent statements regarding their alleged illegality, cast a shadow of doubt 
and uncertainty over an issue that is already marked by high levels of legal complexity. 
Indeed, as one developing country representative noted, the challenges presented by CLs’ 
legal complexity was greatly exacerbated by external pressures and the uncertainty as to 
what falls outside of TRIPS.
20  
 
Vulnerability to external pressures prompted developing countries to seek real, 
and not just formal, flexibilities in IP policy. Developing countries, thus, launched a 
campaign to secure political space to take advantage of their rights under the 






21 The campaign came to the fore in 2001, with a joint WHO/WTO co
on affordable medicines, two Special Sessions of the TRIPS Council dedicated to the 
same topic, and the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Meeting in Doha. A coalition of more than 
fifty developing countries sought to use the Ministerial meeting to affirm their rights 
under TRIPS – to gain assurances that they could use the TRIPS flexibilities for public 
health purposes without having to worry about reprisals. To that end, they deman
Ministerial Statement that would eliminate any outstanding ambiguities and uncertainties 
in TRIPS, and thus shield countries from external pressures that challenged their use of 
TRIPS-acceptable flexibilities to secure access to essential medicines.
22  
 
The ensuing statement took the form of the “Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health.”
23 The Doha Declaration was brief, a seven-section 
statement, less than two pages long, that was designed to clarify members’ obligations 
and rights under TRIPS. The fourth section, which noted that TRIPS “does not and 
should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health,” includes as a 
separate paragraph the critical affirmation of developing countries’ rights “to use, to the 
full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.” 
The declaration also clarifies countries’ rights under Article 31 to issue compulsory 
licenses: “Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.” 
 
The Doha Declaration marks the culmination of a successful campaign to 
strengthen the multilateral system, in that it can protect developing countries from 
opportunistic behaviour of developed countries that pressure for TRIPS Plus.
24 To be 
sure, the Doha Declaration cannot directly constrain the USTR:  – nothing agreed at the 
WTO could guarantee that the US will not continue to subject countries unilaterally to its 
own TRIPS Plus standards. Yet the Doha Declaration potentially raises the associated 
political costs of this sort of opportunistic behavior, for it makes it clear that when the 
U.S. (or other developed countries) act in this way, they, and not the developing 
countries, are violating the WTO’s rules.
25 It makes it more obvious that when the US 
pursues an aggressive TRIPS Plus agenda within the WTO, it is undermining and 
violating its own multilateral commitments. And while such violations may not be 
effectively punishable at the global level, they may impose reputation costs on violators. 
In addition, the agreement provides leverage for domestic political actors who attempt to 
hold government officials to their multilateral obligations.
26  
 
This analysis speaks to some of the key issues of this chapter regarding resources 
and rules in the international political economy. Developing countries’ ability to push 
through the Doha Declaration is rooted in the WTO’s consensus rule, which allowed 
them to make the clarifying Ministerial statement a condition for the formal launching of 
a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. Developing countries blocked the 
launching of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1999 at the WTO’s Third 
Ministerial in Seattle, and this history could have been repeated two years later in Doha. 
Consensus meant that developed countries could not proceed with a new trade round 
without the consent of the developing countries, and developing countries would not 
provide this consent without the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.  
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Although the rules of the WTO clearly empowered developing countries in this 
regard, allowing them to secure the clarifying statement on the important issue of TRIPS 
and health, one must be careful not to overstate the degree of empowerment. After all, 
what, ultimately, developing countries accomplished was clarification and affirmation of 
a set of already-existing rules that they only grudgingly accepted in the Uruguay Round. 
It might very reasonably be suggested that genuine empowerment would allow actors to 
secure new rules that are more in line with their preferences. Indeed, many developing 
countries may wish to substantially revise – or even abolish – TRIPS, but doing so is 
clearly beyond their means.  
 
The limits to developing countries’ power and influence are illustrated by looking, 
briefly, at the aftermath of the Doha Declaration. TRIPS permits countries to issue 
compulsory licenses, a right reaffirmed by the Doha Declaration, but the remaining 
uncertainty regarded the export of drugs produced under CL. After all, few countries can 
produce their own pharmaceuticals, so a compulsory license, to be useful, must permit 
that drugs can be exported from the countries that do have such manufacturing capacity. 
Here TRIPS did indeed complicate matters, by requiring that compulsory licenses must 
be “predominantly” for domestic use (Article 31.f). The Doha Declaration recognized 
this unresolved business and committed members to finding a solution, and for more than 
four years addressing this issue consumed the TRIPS Council. Space limitations preclude 
detailed discussion of these negotiations,
27 though what is clear is that developing 
countries were much less successful here and, ultimately, had to settle for what many 
observers regard as an unsatisfactory resolution. The reason why is that, in contrast to the 
issues addressed in 2000-2001, which entailed clarifying TRIPS, to resolve the CL-for-





Politics of Investment 
 
Managing inward DFI has historically been a key point of economic development 
policy. States regulate international investors, quite simply, because what is best for 
individual enterprises may not be best for all of society. Even states that are largely 
neoliberal in orientation, i.e. guided by the principle that private actors’ autonomous 
decisions regarding resource allocation are optimal, are likely to regulate international 
firms, because local subsidiaries of transnational firms do not make resource allocation 
decisions “autonomously” but rather in coordination with (if not under control of) their 
parent firms.  
 
As in the case of IP, the “North-South” conflict over international investment 
regulation (IIR) is rooted in economic structure. Most DFI (roughly eighty percent) 
occurs among advanced, industrial economies. Developed countries, thus, approach the 
area of IIR as capital exporters and capital importers: Canada and France regulate foreign 
investors, for example, and Canadian and French firms are subject to regulations in other 
countries. Developing countries, in contrast, approach the area of IIR as capital 
importers:  Argentina and Senegal regulate foreign investors but few Argentinean and 
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Senegalese firms are subject to other countries’ regulations.
29 Furthermore, developed 
and developing countries’ interests as capital importers are not the same either, because 
of the different roles that DFI tends to play in the local economy. Foreign investors tend 
to be concentrated in different sectors, use different modes of entry, and account for 
different shares of investment, production, exports, and so on.  
 
Thus, similar to what we see in the case of IP, structural characteristics lead to 
differing perspectives on investment and, subsequently, persistent conflict in the area of 
IIR. Developed countries seek limited regulations on investors, while developing 
countries have historically sought the right to use policy instruments designed to harness 
the benefits of DFI. These instruments include, for example, local content requirements, 
screening entry of foreign investors, equity limitations (i.e. making joint ventures 
compulsory), controls on repatriation of profits and export of capital, and requirements 
regarding technology transfer and the training of human resources. 
 
Although there is little new about the basic observation that states seek to regulate 
inward investment and the claim that conflicts over IIR are rooted in structural 
differences between countries, a set of changes that have occurred since the 1980s have 
brought increased prominence to the issue-area. From the perspective of developing 
countries (i.e. capital importers), we see a new orientation in the wake of debt and 
protracted economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s and, subsequently, widespread trade 
liberalization and privatization. Attracting DFI has become, in most if not all developing 
countries, one of the primary objectives of economic policy. Countries seek investors as 
exporters (and, hopefully, purveyors of skills and technologies); countries seek foreign 
investors as purchasers of privatized state enterprises and suppliers of public services 
(particularly when, as is often the case in poorer countries, local private actors lack the 
capital to take over the state’s role). Most generally, whereas in the past many 
governments were wary of DFI and preferred the autonomy that came from borrowing 
from international banks,
30 in the current environment foreign investors have come to be 
regarded – and desired – as more stable and less mobile forms of capital inflow. Thus, as 
countries become more desiring of and dependent on DFI, they are more wary of 
frightening away potential investors with “over-regulation,” and this changes their 
approach to the area of IIR.  
 
We also see a change from the perspective of developed countries (i.e. capital 
exporters), in that the nature of DFI in developing countries has undergone a shift since 
the 1980s. Whereas DFI had historically been in extractive industries or tariff-hopping 
manufacturing sectors, the contemporary environment is marked by the proliferation of 
“efficiency-seeking” foreign investors seeking to use developing countries as export 
platforms, and by “market-seeking” foreign investors taking over formerly state-reserved 
roles of public service and infrastructure provision. Linked to this change, especially the 
growth of DFI in public services, are new concerns on the part of investors as they move 
into sectors that are, by their very nature, more heavily regulated and more vulnerable to 
expropriation. Also worth noting here is that as international operations represent 
increased shares of some global firms’ revenues, the subject of how subsidiaries are 
regulated becomes more important.  




The upshot of these two sets of changes is that the issue of international 
investment, always a hot topic in “North-South” international political economy, has 
gained increased importance. Capital importing countries have become more desiring of 
and dependent on DFI (and thus wary of potentially frightening investors with “over-
regulation”), and the interest of capital exporting countries has grown on account of the 
greater number and variety of firms with a stake in the rules of IIR. 
 
Now let’s turn to analysis of the North-South politics of IIR in the GATT and 
WTO. As in the case of IP, investment was a domain where countries historically 
retained a great deal of policy autonomy; and as in the case of IP, the 1980s would 
witness an effort by developed countries to embed a more restrictive set of rules on 
investment regulations in the international trade regime. Here too the Uruguay Round 
provided the setting, as developed countries (again, the US as lead demandeur) pushed 




The history of the TRIMS Agreement shares many features with the history of the 
TRIPS Agreement, in that developing countries first resisted inclusion of any 
negotiations at all (arguing that investment was not “trade-related”), and second, when 
unsuccessful in keeping the issue off the Uruguay Round agenda, strongly resisted the 
content of an agreement that threatened to impinge negatively on their autonomous 
economic policy prerogatives.
32 Where the two histories differ, however, is that in the 
area of investment, developing countries were much more successful at exploiting 
differences among developed countries and diluting the final agreement. To understand 
this, it is important to appreciate the breadth of the investment agreement that the US 
initially sought in the UR: the US negotiating objectives extended significantly beyond 
local content requirements per se, and included binding regulations on a wide array of 
investment policies. Indeed, the US sought to restrict specific policies, regardless of their 
demonstrated effects on trade. Not surprisingly, developing countries actively resisted 
such a broad agreement, and the Uruguay Round’s investment negotiations were marked 
by deadlock. Eventually a compromise was reached to limit the agreement to policies 
with direct effects on trade.
33 
 
The subsequent Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) is a 
fairly narrow agreement in that it addresses, as the name suggests, “trade-related” 
investment measures, while leaving countries with significant degrees of latitude 
regarding investment regulation more generally. After all, the agreement does not offer a 
precise definition of what a “trade-related investment measure” is, nor does it establish 
criteria for identifying such measures. The agreement simply provides examples of 
prohibited regulations in the form of an “illustrative list” in the appendix, which countries 
are expected to identify and eliminate. Beyond the measures explicitly included in the 
appendix, however, TRIMS lets countries determine what is and what is not a “trade-
related investment measure,” and, critically, which of their investment measures need to 
be retired. Investment measures that do not violate national treatment or impose 
quantitative restrictions on firms’ imports and exports are legal. Thus, states can screen 
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entry of foreign firms, for example, and demand joint ventures or require foreign firms to 
transfer technology to local firms. And states can regulate foreign investors’ hiring 
practices, with the aim of enhancing development of human capital and skills. Even 
under the more restrictive international regime on investment, developing countries can 
continue to use standard and time-honoured investment regulations as instruments of 
industrial promotion. 
 
To be sure, the agreement does outlaw key investment regulations that have been 
at the heart of many countries’ development strategies, most importantly local content 
requirements, which demand investors to source their inputs locally, and also trade and 
balancing requirements, which oblige foreign investors to include sufficiently high levels 
of domestic inputs in exports to offset imported inputs. Both of these regulations aim to 
generate backwards linkages from foreign investors to local manufacturers, and 
outlawing them clearly takes away developing countries’ ability to use important policy 
instruments to increase local value-added, employment, and industrial upgrading. Yet 
while it would be unwise and inappropriate to downplay the significance of these 
particular – and now prohibited – policy instruments, one cannot but help but note that 
TRIMS is significantly less restrictive than its advocates originally sought (and certainly 
less restrictive and intrusive than TRIPS). In fact, some of these prohibitions enshrined in 
TRIMS actually predate the Uruguay Round. For example, it was under the GATT that 
local content rules were deemed illegal.
34   
 
Developed countries’ dissatisfaction with the outcome achieved in the TRIMS 
negotiations could be seen in the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round. No sooner was the new WTO established, and developed countries sought to re-
initiate negotiations in pursuit of a more broad-based international investment agreement. 
Developed countries (now the EU more than US) made investment a high priority at the 
WTO’s Second Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996. Once again, however, 
developing countries opposed this effort, and the North-South cleavage on investment 
that marked the Uruguay Round remained evident in the post-Uruguay Round setting. 
Developed countries sought a broad-based agreement, more akin to the investment 
chapter in the North American Free Trade Agreement and the many bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) that were proliferating in the 1990s, which proscribe a wide range of 
investment measures; developing countries, seeking to hold the line at TRIMS, attempted 
to keep investment off the negotiating agenda. The compromise settlement was to create 




Before proceeding to discussion of the deadlock’s resolution (or not), it is worth 
underscoring some of the underlying factors that contributed to the North-South 
stalemate over investment. Most obviously and most directly, this was a disagreement 
over the policy flexibility and developing countries’ rights and capacities to regulate 
inward DFI. The TRIMS agreement may have been inadequate from the perspective of 
capital-exporting countries, but few capital importers were likely to agree to a project that 
would make binding regulations more restrictive. Moreover, even developing countries 
that may have had few reservations regarding the substantive dimensions of such an 
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agreement, i.e. governments that are “neoliberal” in orientation and unilaterally removing 
the sorts of provisions that would be prohibited by such an agreement, had ample reasons 
to oppose the inclusion of a broad-based investment provision in the WTO. Many 
countries complained of negotiation and implementation “overload” and, critically, 
asymmetric risks of exposure to dispute settlement. Beginning negotiations on investment 
means yet another issue where countries need to find the resources to participate, and any 
subsequent agreement would lead to yet one more WTO standing body where countries 
would need to be represented. Moreover, since the subsequent rules would be binding on 
governments in capital-importing countries, what developing countries would be 
consenting to would be a legal framework in which they would find themselves more 
likely than not in the position of defendant.
36  
 
When the Doha Round was formally launched in November 2001, investment was 
included on the agenda (paragraphs 20-22 of the Ministerial Declaration). The declaration 
recognized countries’ fundamental right to regulate investors and declared that were any 
negotiations to occur they would proceed on the basis of a “positive list” (like the 
GATS), meaning that countries put forward the sectors where they are prepared to 
negotiate. Yet, notwithstanding these substantive concessions, developing countries (for 
reasons alluded to in the previous paragraph) were not prepared to negotiate. Indeed, as a 
result of the strong resistance of a coalition of developing countries led by India and 
Malaysia (the “Like-Minded Group”), the Ministerial Declaration also stipulated that 
negotiations on investment would proceed only on the basis of “explicit consensus.” That 
is, in contrast to ordinary WTO rules of implicit consensus, which requires a country to 
actively dissent to block consensus (and thus encourages negotiations in closed “green 
room” sessions), the explicit consensus rule for investment required all WTO members to 
actively consent to taking negotiations forward.  
 
By the time of the WTO’s Fifth Ministerial Meeting in Cancún in 2003, the 
WGTI had received nearly fifty submissions,
37 but the precise mandate of Ministers 
remained unclear. Many developed countries (especially the EU) interpreted the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration such that the requirement was for explicit consensus on the 
“modalities” (i.e. the basic terms of agreement). To that end, the Canadian facilitator for 
negotiations on investment (and all the “Singapore Issues”), attempted to push forward, 
on the basis of the submissions received by the WGTI, and reach agreement on 
modalities. Developing countries resisted both this interpretation of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration and the efforts of the Canadian chair, insisting that without explicit 
consensus negotiations could not even proceed.  Indeed, a coalition of sixty developing 
countries formally opposed negotiations in the absence of the “explicit consensus,” and, 
ultimately, refused to negotiate. This refusal, which is what Smythe refers to as “just 
saying no,” contributed to the end of the Cancún Ministerial and meant that investment 
was effectively removed from the Doha Round agenda.
38 While, at the time of writing 
(July 2008), the future of the Doha round as a whole is uncertain, whatever comes out of 
the negotiations will almost certainly not include investment. TRIMS, for better or worse, 
is and will remain the WTO status quo for the foreseeable future.  
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The ability of developing countries to block investment negotiations was a 
function of the WTO’s rules. The Doha Round would not begin if any country objected 
(negative consensus rule), so India could condition its authorization of the 2001 
Ministerial Declaration on the inclusion of what amounted to a “poison pill” in the area 
of IIR. This is a clear instance of institutions providing actors with power and influence 
that are disproportionate to their underlying resources.  
 
Yet, as “victories” go, this is a rather limited outcome. From a development 
perspective, TRIMS only looks good when contrasted to what the developed countries 
sought in the Uruguay Round, sought in the MAI, included in many bilateral investment 
treaties (and investment chapters of RBTAs), and in proposals made to the WGTI.
39 
Developing countries have been able to ward off “more unfavourable” outcomes, but 
they have not been able to secure outcomes in line with their preferences. They could not 
revise the TRIMS Agreement, as many sought, by placing binding obligations on 
investors and home countries and restoring the right to use some investment measures 
that were prohibited during the Uruguay Round. In short, they could prevent a “bad 
situation” (TRIMS) from getting worse, so to speak, but they remain unable to fashion an 
outcome that matches – or even approximates – their preferences. Developing countries 





In reviewing the North-South politics of IP and investment, I have shown how 
institutional arrangements – in particular the consensus rules of the WTO – can give 
weaker actors more power and influence than we might expect from simply reading off 
the underlying distribution of resources. After all, developed countries are stronger and, 
subsequently, a structuralist approach would lead us to expect them to be able to impose 
their preferences. Yet they have not: for all their efforts to rewrite the rules regarding IP 
and investment in the post-Uruguay Round period, they have not succeeded. Developing 
countries – weak as they may be – have seen to it that the WTO’s rules on IP and 
investment are essentially the same in 2008 as they were at the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round in 1994. This finding represents a clear tick in the institutionalists’ column.  
 
Yet all the power developing countries have exercised has been essentially 
“blocking” power. In both instances, developing countries would like to introduce more 
substantive reforms, both to TRIPS and TRIMS, but have been unable to do so. Instead 
they settle for clarification of rules that most countries strongly objected to in the first 
place and preventing the imposition of what many regard as even more unfavourable 
rules. Developing countries have been able to prevent (or at least limit) the imposition of 
rules that exceeded what they agreed to in the Uruguay Round, either by clarifying the 
rules and thus creating a check on unilateral pressures (IP) or preventing additional 
multilateral negotiations (investment). What they have been unable to do, however, is act 
proactively – to secure agreement on new WTO rules that are more to their liking.
40  
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Of course, the ability of developing countries to block developed countries’ 
initiatives in the areas of IP and investment only begs the more critical question of why, 
if they can do this now, they could not do it before and stop these agreements in the first 
place. Or to put it differently, if developing countries can prevent the unfavourable 
Uruguay Round agreements from being supplanted by a set of more unfavourable Doha 
Round agreements, why could they not prevent the more favourable Tokyo Round 
agreements from being supplanted by the unfavourable Uruguay Round agreements? 
After all, they did try: as discussed, developing countries opposed TRIPS and TRIMS in 
the Uruguay Round, just as they oppose developed countries’ TRIPS-Plus and TRIMS-
Plus initiatives in the contemporary environment. Why did they acquiesce to the former 
but block the latter? The answer to this question gets to the heart of the analysis, and in 
particular the interface between institutionalist and structuralist approaches. Addressing 
this question, then, sheds light on both the importance and limitations of international 
institutions.   
 
The existence of a “single undertaking” is frequently invoked as an explanation 
for why developing countries accepted TRIMS and TRIPS in the Uruguay Round.
 In 
previous rounds, countries chose whether or not to sign on to supplemental codes, but the 
single undertaking meant that the Uruguay Round was an all or nothing affair. But that 
explanation is unsatisfactory without considering the exercise of power that made the 
introduction of this institutional device feasible and, moreover, effective. After all, the 
single undertaking itself was new – an institutional reform introduced to gain developing 
countries’ consent to agreements that they had resisted.
41 
 
The key to making the single undertaking work was to make the WTO the only 
game in town. That is, the way to get developing countries to accept a set of Uruguay 
Round agreements that they had fiercely rejected was to make the alternative to 
acceptance being excluded from the international trade regime. But how to do that? After 
all, many developing countries were already members of the GATT, which offered MFN 
access to the developed countries’ markets. Any tariff reductions made in the Uruguay 
Round, then, would have to be granted on a MFN basis to GATT members, even if they 
rejected TRIPS and TRIMS. Thus the key would be to eliminate the GATT from the 
shadows of the WTO.  
 
At the end of the Uruguay Round, all countries who participated in the 
negotiations signed the “Final Act” and thus became signatories to all the various WTO 
agreements. One of the texts included in the Final Act was the GATT 1994, a new 
agreement that incorporated – but superseded – the GATT 1947. The Uruguay Round’s 
Final Act stipulates that GATT 1994 is “legally distinct” from GATT 1947. Most 
importantly – and this is the frequently overlooked point – immediately upon joining the 
WTO (including GATT 1994) the US and EC both withdrew from GATT 1947, thus 
terminating their obligations under GATT 1947.
42 Any country that did not sign Uruguay 
Round’s Final Agreement and join the WTO would, formally, retain their rights under 
GATT 1947, but since the largest countries with the most important markets were no 
longer bound by GATT 1947, non-joiners would be left with empty rights. The result of 
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this is that MFN-based market access is only available to countries that joined the WTO, 
thereby consenting TRIPS and TRIMS and GATS and the ASCM and so on.  
 
This review of how developed countries exercised power to create an institutional 
device (the single undertaking) that would secure a favourable outcome of the Uruguay 
Round remains relevant for the subsequent analysis of the Doha Round that I have 
discussed in this chapter. The case of IP and investment negotiations in the Doha Round 
shows how unweighted voting and the consensus system give developing countries 
unexpected power. The WTO's decision making procedures inflate developing countries’ 
power; institutions are endowing countries with influence that they would otherwise lack 
in the absence of these rules. Developing countries could condition the launch of a new 
round of multilateral trade negotiations, which developed countries had sought since 
1996, on an agreement that would draw the line under TRIPS Plus demands, and they 
could make sure that the subsequent round did not include negotiations on investment.  
 
The key point, however, is that we see this power-enhancing effect because the 
WTO already exists, and, in contrast to the early 1990s, no one is (yet – but see below) 
talking about effectively replacing the WTO with a new international trade institution. In 
other words, the “power play” described by Steinberg is not being replicated.
43 In the 
Uruguay Round, developing countries were weakened because a new organization was 
created that supplanted the existing organization, which meant that the consequences of 
blocking conclusion would have been to be left out in the cold, not in the new WTO and 
members of an old – and now useless – GATT 1947. In the current environment, 
however, the consequences of blocking conclusion of Doha Round is maintenance of the 
status quo. Developing countries’ power, albeit only “blocking power,” is derived from 
the fact that they are in WTO and cannot be excluded or expelled from the WTO.  
 
This discussion speaks to Gruber’s insights that some countries might sign 
agreements that they do not like because the alternative is not the status quo but 
something worse than the status quo – and that more powerful countries with resources to 
“go it alone” can present weaker countries with this new choice set.
44 Such dynamics 
help explain the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and their absence helps explain the 
persistent deadlock in the Doha Round. Developing countries have less to fear in the 
current setting because developed countries are no longer exercising what Gruber refers 
to as their “go it alone power.” As a result, obstinate resisters are not left facing 
something worse than the status quo.  
 
To conclude, it is worth questioning the sustainability of the scenario. Developing 
countries’ newfound influence in international trade negotiations is derived from the 
institutional setting, but for that very reason the power is extremely fragile. Institutions 
that generate outcomes that deviate far from what might be expected from the underlying 
distribution of resources are unstable.
45 Developed countries closed one institution and 
created another in the 1990s. Would they do that again? Legally they can: withdrawing 
from GATT 1994 is as simple as withdrawing from GATT 1947 was. Yet there is little 
evidence of any schemes to replace the existing international trading regime with a new 
one. Perhaps the proliferation of regional agreements is a movement in that direction, a 
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de facto (if not explicit) effort to leave the WTO and create a new WTO-plus world that 
those developing countries on the outside will feel compelled to join – just as developed 
countries left GATT 1947 and created a new GATT-plus world that resisters to the 
Uruguay Round found compelled to join. There are sound reasons to question the 
viability of regional and bilateral strategy, but just raising it as a possibility speaks to the 
fragility of rule-based power and the undying importance of the distribution of resources 
in the shaping of the international economic order.  
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